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Introduction
On 8 May 2015, the Conservative party won an unexpected
majority in the UK general election.1 Commentators argued
that a potentially decisive factor was concern in England
about the Scottish National Party (SNP) forcing a minority
Labour government to ‘dance to the SNP’s tune.’2 Meanwhile
the SNP won a historic number of seats in Scotland, captur-
ing 56 of the 59 Westminster constituencies.
The election took place against a backdrop of debate about
the future of the UK. Although the Scottish independence
referendum was lost, it was widely agreed that the status quo
no longer remained feasible. At the same time, there is pres-
sure to revisit Welsh devolution3 and the Westminster govern-
ment has proposed devolving certain powers to locally elected
decision-makers in English regions.4 Meanwhile, the new
Conservative government has committed to a referendum on
continuing European Union membership, reﬂecting calls for
‘Brexit’.5 Although initially emanating from those on the right
of the political spectrum, there is now some support from the
left,6 making it a real possibility and likely to trigger a second
Scottish referendum. One way or another, substantial political
change is looming.
If we conceive of ‘health’ as ‘health care’ (as many political
scientists do), it could be argued that further devolution has
little signiﬁcance since responsibility for the NHS is already
devolved to each national administration.7 Yet, most of the
major determinants of population health and health inequal-
ities lie outside the health system, often in areas for which
responsibility has so far remained in Westminster.8,9 For
example, macro-economic and welfare policies have large
health impacts, potentially more so than health services and,10
while the relatively modest scale of devolution has not yet led
to marked divergence in such policies, this looks set to
change. We apply a political science framework focussing on
ideas, interests and institutions to demonstrate potential op-
portunities and threats to public health arising from political
change, so that researchers and practitioners can better
engage with the political determinants of health.
Political devolution in the UK
In contrast to federal systems (where power is shared be-
tween regions and the nation-state), the UK was, until the
late 20th century, characterized as having a strong central
government—the so-called ‘Westminster Model’.11 In 1999,
the Labour government began a period of rapid constitutional
change. Initially, it created new centres of power, including the
Scottish Parliament, Welsh Assembly, Northern Ireland
Executive and Greater London Authority.12,13 These institu-
tions were not created equal—each gained different political
portfolios reﬂecting pre-existing differences among them.
The Scottish Ofﬁce, for example, had longstanding responsi-
bility for adapting Westminster legislation to Scotland’s separ-
ate legal and educational systems. The creation of a modern
Scottish Parliament went beyond this, assuming legislative re-
sponsibility in devolved policy areas such as health, education
and justice.14 The Welsh Assembly, in contrast, had less of a
foundation for operating independently to Westminster and
only achieved limited legislative powers in 2006. Meanwhile,
the situation in Northern Ireland has been complicated by de-
volution sitting within the framework of an international
agreement with the Republic of Ireland,15 and has been inter-
rupted by breakdowns in the Northern Ireland peace process.
For all three regions, health policy was one of the most im-
portant policy areas initially devolved. The Greater London
Authority has no legislative or executive responsibility for
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health but is responsible for policies such as transport that
impact on health.
The relationship between the devolved administrations and
the UK Parliament is complicated by two issues. First, as devo-
lution did not lead to a federal UK structure since an English
elected assembly/parliament was not created, there have been
concerns about the equity of a system allowing Scottish and
Welsh MPs to vote on matters which may only affect communi-
ties living in England (the so-called ‘West Lothian’ question, dis-
cussed below). Second, only some elements of a policy area may
be ‘devolved’14 meaning responsibility for decision-making is
not always clear, with jurisdiction potentially stretching across
devolved institutions, the UK Parliament and European institu-
tions. Additionally, as the SNP has noted, the policy links across
the UK mean decisions about England may have considerable
implications for other territories.16 Adding to this complexity,
devolution is better understood as a ‘process’ evolving over
time, rather than an ‘event’.14
The UK: a process of growing
fragmentation
Much of the momentum for constitutional reform derives from
the recent Scottish referendum, intended to settle the question of
Scottish independence for ‘a generation’.17 Two days before the
vote, facing possible defeat, the leaders of the three main UK
political parties very publicly vowed that ‘The Scottish Parliament
is permanent and extensive new powers for the Parliament will
be delivered’.18 Lord Smith, an independent cross-bench peer,
was therefore asked to produce recommendations for devolving
further powers. The Smith Commission’s report included mea-
sures to allow the Scottish Parliament to control aspects of
welfare policy (including beneﬁts for carers and disabled people),
support for unemployed people and aspects of taxation (includ-
ing a proportion of income tax and value added tax), all of which
have impact health.19 In May 2015, the Scotland Act was intro-
duced to the House of Commons and, at the time of writing, is
proceeding through the legislative process.20
However, power will not only ﬂow from Westminster to
Scotland. Once the Scottish referendum votes were in, it became
clear that any new powers would be part of a broader package
of UK-wide change, giving greater powers to English cities and
threatening to diminish the rights of Scotland-based members of
theUK (Westminster) parliament.On themorning of the Scottish
referendum result,DavidCameron surprisedmany by saying:
We have heard the voice of Scotland - and now the millions
of voices of England must also be heard. The question of
English votes for English laws - the so-called West Lothian
question - requires a decisive answer.”21
English votes for English laws (EVEL) has been presented as
a solution to the West Lothian question (named after the con-
stituency of Tam Dalyell, the MP who ﬁrst raised the issue),
which asks why Scottish MPs can vote at Westminster on
matters not affecting their constituents.14 For example, New
Labour’s establishment of Foundation Trusts in 2003 was
only possible because Scottish Labour MPs supported the
policy, which did not affect the Scottish NHS.22 EVEL could
bring about a profound change in the power of different polit-
ical parties. Based on recent voting patterns, this seems likely
to favour the Conservative Party. The government’s propo-
sals,23,24 by means of a change to the standing orders of the
House of Commons, would have avoided the difﬁculties of
gaining consent from the House of Lords. While it was with-
drawn in the face of opposition from the Conservative back-
benches, EVEL remains a government goal.
George Osborne, Chancellor of the Exchequer, has called
for the imbalance across the English regions to be addressed,
seeking to ‘make the cities of the north a powerhouse for our
economy again – with new transport and science and power-
ful city governance’.25 The promise of greater powers is being
rapidly implemented, with new democratic posts introduced
and existing institutions strengthened, albeit with many ques-
tions still unanswered.4,26 Greater Manchester is at the fore-
front, with a newly established mayor (responsible for a
devolved transport and housing budget, as well as inﬂuence
over strategic planning). The Greater Manchester Combined
Authority’s inﬂuence will also increase so it jointly commis-
sions health and social care (with local clinical commissioning
groups) and controls some aspects of return-to-work initia-
tives, children’s services and business development,27,28 al-
though how this can be reconciled with the Health and Social
Care Act remains unexplained29 and there are already signs of
tensions emerging.30 While greater political engagement
appears to have followed Scottish devolution, it remains un-
certain whether the same will happen in England—especially
in Manchester, where the local electorate voted against intro-
ducing a Mayor.31
Increased decision-making powers have been transferred
to other devolved institutions too. The Commission on
Devolution in Wales was established to review the Welsh
Assembly’s powers and published its recommendations in
two parts.32 The ﬁrst part called for the Welsh Assembly to
have ownership over some aspects of ﬁscal policy (such as the
ability to vary income tax and responsibility over stamp duty)
and was implemented in legislation through the Wales Act
2014. The second set of proposals included decision-making
over police and youth justice and these are being implemented
incrementally, with a Wales Bill expected shortly.3,33 Northern
Ireland, in contrast, has had little change in its decision-making
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powers, partly as a result of the Assembly’s suspension
between 2002 and 2007 following the ‘troubles’. While no
formal review over powers has occurred, civil society is debat-
ing the issue.34
Understanding policy change: ideas,
institutions and interests
Within political science and policy studies, three recurring
concepts are often employed to explain policy change: ideas,
institutions and interests, sometimes referred to as the ‘3-Is’
framework.35,36 Each is now considered, with a view to identi-
fying questions for public health professionals to consider—
summarized in Table 1.
Ideas
In seeking to understand what explains policy change, many
political scientists focus on the role of ideas.37 Smith argues
that there are distinct idea-types, each with characteristics that
aid, or restrict, their potential to inﬂuence policy.38 Taking the
example of minimum unit pricing for alcohol, we suggest that
devolution may play help stimulate new policy ideas.38 The ex-
ceptionally high burden of alcohol-related harm in Scotland39
regularly attracts negative media and international policy
attention.40,41 While there is compelling evidence on the
effectiveness of price-related interventions,42 the Scottish
Government did not have responsibility for alcohol taxation
and was therefore unable to increase alcohol’s price through
traditional policy measures.43 In a political climate more
accepting of government intervention than Westminster, an
opportunity was available for alternative ways of tackling
alcohol-related harms and ‘minimum unit pricing’ (which
introduces a ﬂoor price, based on alcohol content, below
which alcohol cannot be sold) was proposed.44,45 Crucially,
the evidence suggests it will yield greater health beneﬁts
than equivalent taxation changes.46 Consequently, the
limited legislative powers of devolved institutions (discussed
further below) may drive innovation resulting in more ef-
fective policy. However, smaller jurisdictions may lack cap-
acity to develop and take forward new ideas.47
Devolution of further powers to Scotland and Wales alters
the political context within which a broader range of decisions
are made. Looking forward in Scotland, the SNP has consist-
ently opposed austerity policies,48 so devolution of welfare
policy presents an opportunity for alternative ideas about
welfare to move onto the Scottish policy agenda. NHS Health
Scotland, a Special Health Board that provides the Scottish
Government with advice, is already arguing for a different ap-
proach.49 If policy diverges between Scotland and England,
there will be opportunities for researchers to contrast the
health effects of these two differing approaches. While these
‘natural experiments’ could be invaluable in research
terms,50,51 policy variations could exacerbate geographic in-
equalities across the UK, with implications for front line
health staff.
Institutions
Context, including the history and organization of political
institutions, also shapes decision-making.52 As Immergut
puts it, ‘institutions—be they the formal rules of political
arenas, channels of communication, language codes or the
logics of strategic situations—act as ﬁlters that selectively
favour particular interpretations either of the goals toward
which political actors strive or of the best means to achieve
these ends.’53 Under current arrangements, only the UK gov-
ernment has responsibility for policy issues such as defence,
foreign affairs and macro-economic policy. Policy proposals
to improve population health must therefore compete for le-
gislative time against myriad issues at Westminster. In con-
trast, devolved assemblies have concentrated on domestic
issues, such as health, education, and social care.14 In some
cases, where issues cut across the policy responsibilities of
multiple institutions/levels, this division may limit the poten-
tial for holistic policy responses. On the other hand, the
smaller size of devolved institutions may facilitate joined-up
thinking—this has been the intention of the Scottish
Government doing away with departmental divisions to
promote a ‘whole-of-government’ approach to complex
social issues,54 although its success has yet to be evaluated. In
addition to party political variation, institutional differences
Table 1 Questions to ask when developing a public health advocacy
strategy in an era of devolution
Issue Description
Ideas What public health problems are priorities and might the
changing political circumstances increase/reduce
opportunities to promote these priorities? What are the
optimal policy solutions to these issues, from a public
health perspective, and how does the local political
climate help or hinder their adoption?
Institutions Which political institutions are relevant and what powers
do they have to tackle public health policy priorities?
Interests Who are the different stakeholders with an interest in
influencing decisions that impact on public health and
how will changing political circumstances enable (or
constrain) these different interests from influencing policy?
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could help with the sub-national introduction of health-
enhancing policies currently low on the UK political agenda55—a
feature observed elsewhere in Europe (Box 1).
Box 1 Federalism in other parts of Europe
Regions in federal countries have often been able to pursue
public health policies that have been unachievable at national
level. In Germany, for example, the tobacco industry has long
been extremely powerful.56 The national government intro-
duced a ban on smoking in federal buildings and public trans-
port in January 2007 but was unable to legislate for other
public places. More ambitiously, the regions of
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg and Lower Saxony banned smoking in res-
taurants, bars and clubs in August 2007, followed in October
by Hesse. However, other regions took longer and, in many, the
bans that emerged were limited.
Also in Germany, North Rhine Westphalia developed innovative
methods of establishing health targets, bringing together the
normally fragmented public health and healthcare actors, as did
Catalonia, in Spain.57 Elsewhere in Spain, the Basque Country
has been a pioneer in the development of models of integrated
care. In Sweden, the Va¨stra Go¨taland region developed an
Action Plan for Health Equity that has attracted considerable at-
tention in other parts of the country.
If these trends continue, public health may beneﬁt. On the
other hand, increasing fragmentation of power across multiple
political institutions may create new barriers to tackling
‘wicked issues’, which require coordinated action across dif-
ferent sectors and levels of government. Devolution already
means responsibility for tackling cross-cutting policy areas
within the UK can be unclear12 and the problems are espe-
cially acute where action is required at a European or inter-
national level. The English Department of Health also takes
lead responsibility for the entire UK (and dependent territor-
ies) in international fora, with little scope for their distinctive
voices to be heard.
While opportunities for promoting public health consid-
erations may increase following a proliferation of political
fora, the capacity of each decision-making institution to co-
ordinate action across sectors may be limited. Opportunities
may arise in different parts of the country at different times,
but coordination across sectors (such as health, welfare and
taxation policy) could become more difﬁcult in this context,
requiring alignment across all levels of government, rather
than just at Westminster. There is also a risk that policy areas
perceived as politically unpopular (such as reforming taxation)
may be neglected by institutions, despite increased powers, to
avoid assuming political responsibility. Box 2 illustrates some
of these challenges in relation to health inequalities policy.
Box 2 Health inequalities policy in the
devolved UK
Efforts to reduce health inequalities provide an example of the
difficulties that may arise as a consequence of the lack of a
single governing institution. Such inequalities are commonly
viewed as a ‘wicked problem’ that requires coordinated actions
across multiple policy sectors (such as employment, welfare,
health, education). However, coordinating actions across all
these sectors may become more difficult in any one of the UK
territories or regions if the number of political venues increases.
A recent survey of 92 health inequalities researchers working in
the UK found that the majority believed that the most effective
policy proposals for reducing health inequalities involved more
progressive taxation, achieving a minimum income and provid-
ing better (and more targeted) public services and support.58
The top five proposals, summarized below, all involve policy
decisions which are currently shaped by devolved, UK and
European policies:
1. Review and implement more progressive systems of taxation,
benefits, pensions and tax credits that provide greater
support for people at the lower end of the social gradient
and do more to reduce inequalities in wealth.
2. Develop and implement a minimum income for healthy
living.
3. Increase the proportion of overall government expenditure
allocated to the early years and ensure this expenditure is fo-
cussed progressively across the social gradient.
4. Increase social protection for those on the lowest incomes
and provide more flexible income and welfare support for
those moving in and out of work.
5. Support an enhanced home building program and invest in
decent social housing to bring down housing costs.
Following the Smith Commission’s report, Scotland’s responsi-
bility for many of these areas remains unclear and their intro-
duction in a coordinated manner is likely to be difficult. For
example, increased expenditure on social protection by the
Scottish Government may only be achievable if it also has direct
control over revenue accruing from any tax-varying decisions.
Furthermore, the lack of clarity around where responsibility lies
for these policy areas may provide a means for politicians to
avoid taking responsibility for these potentially politically sensi-
tive topics.
Political institutions within the UK are also subject to con-
straints imposed by supranational organizations and agree-
ments (e.g. European Union policy and international trade
agreements). Historically, many of these evolved from
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negotiations to foster ‘free trade’, that is to help increase trade
between countries by removing potential barriers to the free
movement of goods and services.59,60 A primary focus on
trade may result in policies that harm other important policy
areas (such as health or environmental concerns).61 Over
time, many institutions (and especially the European Union)
have broadened their scope to include human rights,
monetary policy as well as health, thus implying the domin-
ance of economic interests may have lessened.59 The limited
empirical evidence is currently somewhat contradictory,
suggesting that within the European Union, trade interests
remain inﬂuential but by no means universally dominant.62,63
Meanwhile, the increased economic responsibility of regional
authorities in England provides an opportunity for the public
health voice to argue for economic development that
beneﬁts population health and meets the needs of the most
disadvantaged.
The rules and cultural norms through which policy is made
inﬂuences both whose voices are heard and also the type of
evidence sought.64 As political reforms are implemented, the
processes through which policy communities debate and
make decisions changes.65,66 This therefore provides an op-
portunity to shape the processes by which decisions are
made, not just the content of speciﬁc decisions. This presents
public health professionals with an opportunity to encourage
a culture in which health concerns are embedded in long-term
public policy debates.
Interests
Several political science theories highlight how policy is strongly
inﬂuenced by a diverse range of interests, including public
health advocates, corporate interests and civil society.52 Changes
in political institutions present new opportunities for such inter-
ests to inﬂuence policy and could lead to existing policy net-
works being reshaped or new ones emerging.67 This could
serve to strengthen public health advocates, as their voices may
be heard more readily—perhaps especially when sub-national
political parties campaigning for independence are seeking to
develop distinctive policy approaches.43,68 In the UK case, sub-
national leadership has been important in developing effective
tobacco control.69 On the other hand, more dispersed political
power may overwhelm the small community engaged in public
health advocacy. Large corporate interests face fewer resource
constraints and may, therefore, be relatively advantaged. For
example, decisions to withhold licences for alcohol sales in a
heavily provided area of Edinburgh were overturned following
appeals made by a team of lawyers on behalf of Sainsbury’s
supermarket.70 Countering a shift in power toward vested inter-
ests will require close collaboration amongst international alli-
ances of public health advocates.
Vested corporate interests could beneﬁt from the overlap-
ping remits of different political institutions mentioned above
by choosing to frame the policy debate in ways that advantage
them. For example, the same policy problem can often be
presented as primarily a health or trade issue.44,71–73 This is
illustrated by experience with tobacco control following devo-
lution. The Scottish tobacco display ban, introduced as a
public health measure, has faced numerous unsuccessful chal-
lenges in the Scottish, UK and European courts, primarily on
account of its alleged trade impact.74 As the number of policy-
making ‘levels’ increases, so too does the scope for vested inter-
ests to re-locate policy issues to the jurisdictions they believe are
most likely to favour them. It also provides them with an oppor-
tunity to mount legal challenges, based on claims that particular
measures exceed the powers of the subordinate legislature.75
Although rarely successful over the long-term, these challenges
can introduce considerable delay and distract public health ofﬁ-
cials from making progress elsewhere.
The need for a politically responsive
public health
Further change to the UK’s political institutions and accom-
panying policy divergence across the UK’s countries and
regions seem inevitable. These reforms, coupled with a poten-
tial UK exit from the European Union, will bring both oppor-
tunities and challenges for public health. If the public health
community is serious about embedding ‘health in all policies’
over the long-term, we will need to ensure our voice is clearly
heard at all levels of decision-making and provide evidence
that is tailored to evolving institutional responsibilities in a
changing political climate. Looking forward, there appears to
be some political appetite for divergence in welfare, housing
and potentially even ﬁscal policy, providing greater opportun-
ities for evaluating natural policy experiments relating to key
social determinants. Public health professionals should be at
the forefront in developing the health-focussed evidence-base
for these areas, ready to advocate for the health needs of their
populations when opportunities present themselves.
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